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Abstract 
Presidential election outcomes are well explained by just two objectively measured 
fundamental determinants: (1) weighted-average growth of per capita real personal 
disposable income over the term, and (2) cumulative US military fatalities owing to 
unprovoked, hostile deployments of American armed forces in foreign conflicts. The US 
economy weakened at the beginning of 2008 and average per capita real income growth 
probably will be only around 0.75% at Election Day. Moreover cumulative US military 
fatalities in Iraq will reach 4,300 or more. Given those fundamental conditions, the Bread 
and Peace model predicts a Republican two-party vote share centered on 48.2%. 
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1  Background 
My analysis of the fundamental determinants of aggregate presidential voting outcomes and their 
implications for the 2008 election draws upon research reported in my earlier Public Choice article 
(Hibbs 2000)1 and in my unpublished 2007 paper “The Economy, the War in Iraq and the 2004 
Presidential Election.”2 
The Bread and Peace model assumes that postwar American presidential elections should for 
the most part be interpreted as a sequence of referendums on the White House party’s economic 
record. The incumbent party is punished for poor economic performance and rewarded for good 
performance. Economic performance is best measured by a weighted-average of quarterly growth 
rates of per capita real disposable personal income, computed from the election quarter back to the 
first full quarter of each presidential term. Growth of per capita real disposable personal income is 
the broadest single aggregate measure of changes in voters’ economic well-being in as much as it 
includes income from all market sources, is adjusted for inflation, taxes, government transfer 
payments and population growth, and tends to move with changes in unemployment. 
 The only additional factor systematically affecting postwar aggregate votes for president is US 
military fatalities owing to unprovoked, hostile deployments of American armed forces in foreign 
conflicts not sanctioned by a formal Congressional declaration of war – namely the American 
military interventions in Korea, Vietnam and most recently Iraq. My research shows that the 
electoral penalties exacted by Korea, Vietnam and Iraq fall almost wholly on the party initiating the 
commitment of US forces – the Democrats for Korea and Vietnam, the Republicans for Iraq – and 
they are proportionate to the cumulative numbers of American military fatalities, adjusted for 
population size. Other factors of course influence presidential voting, sometimes dramatically, but 
they vary randomly from election to election. Because such events are idiosyncratic rather than 
systematic, they cannot be incorporated to the Bread and Peace model which aims to pin down 
quantitatively the impact of persistent fundamental determinants. 
 The Bread and Peace model is designed to explain presidential election outcomes in terms of 
objectively measured political-economic fundamentals rather than to predict optimally election 
results or to track them statistically after the fact. For those reasons the model includes no arbitrarily 
                                                 
1 The basic functional form of the economic factor in the Bread and Peace equation was first proposed in my earlier 
article (Hibbs 1982). I review the large literature on macroeconomic conditions and voting in (Hibbs 2006). 
2 The 2007 paper is available at http://douglas-hibbs.com/HibbsArticles/QJPS_2007.pdf. It was rejected by the Quarterly 
Journal of Political Science as “unnecessarily acerbic” in its criticism of an article by William Nordhaus published in the 
same journal (Nordhaus 2006) that contrasted my model to various equations proposed by Nordhaus’ Yale economics 
department colleague Ray Fair (http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/vote2008/index2.htm) . See the QJPS rejection history at 
http://douglas-hibbs.com/HibbsArticles/QJPS_History.pdf. 
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coded dummy, trend, count, or switching variables which have no connection to objectively 
measured policies and performance affecting voters.3 Likewise the Bread and Peace model makes 
no use of pre-election poll readings of voter sentiments, preferences and opinions. Attitudinal 
variables are themselves affected by objective fundamentals and consequently they supply no 
insight into the root causes of voting behavior, even though they may provide good predictions of 
voting results.4 In fact the best predictions of presidential elections (along with other elections and 
other events) most likely are obtained from price data at betting sites like Intrade (www.intrade.com) 
where punters lay real money on the table.5  
2  The Bread and Peace Equation 
Estimation of the following simple nonlinear equation yields quantitative estimates of the effects on 
votes for president of per capita real income growth and the cumulative number of American military 
fatalities in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq: 
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• Vote is the percentage share of the two-party vote for president received by the 
candidate of the incumbent party. 
• R is per capita disposable personal income deflated by the Consumer Price Index. 
ln tRΔ  is the quarter-to-quarter percentage change expressed at annual rates, computed 
( )1log 400t tR R − ⋅ . The weighted sum of annualized quarterly real income growth rates 
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3 A prominent example is the equation currently favored by Ray Fair 
(http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/RAYFAIR/PDF/2006CHTM.HTM) – five of the seven regressors in Fair’s equation are 
ad-hoc dummies, trends or counts. See (Bartels 1997) for a critical discussion of the ad-hoc use of such variables. 
4 Leading examples of presidential election prediction equations using attitudinal variables are reviewed by (Wlezien and 
Erikson 2004). 
5 According to (Erikson and Wlezien 2008) poll data on average outperform the Iowa Electronic Market betting data in 
forecasting presidential election outcomes between 1988 and 2004. The IEM market however is a university run 
operation with constrained betting (the limit is currently five hundred dollars per individual) and quite thin trading by 
comparison to commercial enterprises like Intrade. 
6 At the election quarter the weight ( )0, 1jj λ= =  is scaled down to 1/3 because of the within-quarter date of 
presidential elections (the first Tuesday following the first Monday of November). 
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coefficient 1β  represents the effect on the incumbent vote share of each percentage 
point of weighted-average annualized quarter-to-quarter real income growth sustained 
over the presidential term. As the weighting parameter λ  approaches a value of 1.0 the 
incumbent party vote share is affected by a simple average of per capita real income 
growth rates over the whole term; growth at the beginning of the term has the same 
electoral impact as growth just before the election. As λ  approaches zero only the 
election quarter growth rate affects votes for president. Values of λ  between 0 and 1 
determine the relative political importance of real income growth rates just before the 
election as compared to growth rates earlier in the term. 
• Fatalities denotes the cumulative number of American military fatalities per million US 
population in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq during the presidential terms preceding the 1952, 
1964, 1968, 1976 and 2004 elections.7 
Table 1 reports nonlinear-least-squares estimates of the Bread and Peace equation for presidential 
elections spanning 1952-2004. The model was fit using data on population and disposable personal 
incomes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov) and consumer prices from the 
Department of Labor (www.stats.bls.gov), along with data on US military fatalities in Korea, Vietnam 
and Iraq originating with the US Department of Defense.8  
According to the coefficient estimates in Table 1, each percentage point of growth in per capita 
real disposable personal income sustained over a presidential term boosts the in-party candidate’s 
vote share by about 3.6 percentage points above a benchmark constant of approximately 46%. The 
weighting parameter estimate ˆ 0.91λ =  implies that the real income growth rate in the last full quarter 
before an election (q3 of election years) has more than three times the electoral impact of income 
growth in the first full quarter of the term ( )140.91 0.91 3.44= . The fatalities coefficient estimate 
means that each 100 US military fatalities per million population owing to hostile deployments of US 
forces in unprovoked wars depresses the incumbent vote by about 5 percentage points. 
  
                                                 
7 Prior to 2004 my periodic applications of the Bread and Peace model did not scale cumulative US military fatalities to 
population. Yet the US had 158 million inhabitants at the time of the 1952 election and will have approximately 306 
million at the 2008 election, so scaling fatalities to population makes good sense even though the quantitative effects 
implied by the scaled and un-scaled equations are very similar. 
8 The BEA income data are from the May 29 2008 revision of the National Income and Product Accounts – the 2008q4 
data are preliminary and are subject to revision (perhaps substantial) later. Military fatalities in Iraq are from 
www3.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/forces/casualties/interactive and www.icasualties.org/oif. Data on fatalities in 
Korea and Vietnam were obtained by the author from the National Defense University Library in Carlyle Pennsylvania. 
Stata program and data files for results in this article are available at http://www.douglas-
hibbs.com/HibbsArticles/hibbs_downloadable.htm. 
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Table 1. Bread and Peace Equation Estimates 
 
    
Dependent variable: 
incumbent two-party vote 
share (%) 
  
 
N = 14  
elections  
1952 – 2004 
 
 
 2R  = .87 Adj 2R  =.83 Root MSE =2.38 
 
  
coefficient estimate 
 
std. error 
 
p-value 
 
Constant ( )α  
 
 
46.2 
 
1.22 
 
.000 
Weighted-average 
per capita real disposable 
personal income growth 
rate, % ( )1β  
 
 
3.55 
 
0.605 
 
.000 
Lag weight ( )λ  
 
0.909 0.057 .000 
US military fatalities per 
million population ( )2β  
 
-0.052 0.013 .002 
 
 
The pronounced connection of two-party vote shares received by incumbent party candidates to 
weighted-average per capita real income growth rates over the term at postwar elections 1952-2004 
is graphed in Figure 1. (Appendix Table A1 shows more statistics for each election.) Voting 
outcomes in 1952 and 1968 exhibit the biggest deviations from the regression prediction line – they 
register the effects of the second fundamental determinant of presidential voting: American military 
fatalities in unprovoked foreign wars.  
High cumulative US military fatalities in Korea at the time of the 1952 election (29,260 or 190 per 
million population) and in Vietnam at the 1968 election (28,900 or 146 per million population) cost 
candidates of the incumbent Democratic party dearly, most likely causing Adlai Stevenson’s loss to 
Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 and almost certainly causing Hubert Humphrey’s loss to Richard Nixon 
in 1968. Absent America’s interventions in the Korean and Vietnamese civil wars, the strong real 
income growth record prior to those elections easily should have kept the Democrats in the White 
House.  
In principle, military fatalities due to discretionary American involvement in foreign conflicts were 
also relevant to the 1964, 1976 and 2004 election contests, but the impact on aggregate votes was 
negligible because the fatality numbers were small. At the 2004 election, for example, US military 
6 
fatalities in Iraq stood at 1,130 (3.86 per million population) – too few to exert great negative effect 
on the vote for Bush. However by the time of the 2008 election US military fatalities will have 
quadrupled. Consequently, as I show ahead, Iraq will play a more important role in 2008 than in 
2004. 
 
 
 
3.  The Economy, Iraq and the 2008 Election 
Republican fortunes in 2008 will depend on the severity of the US economic contraction now 
underway and the accumulation of US military fatalities in Iraq. Over the first full twelve quarters of 
President Bush’s second term (2005q2 – 2008q1) the weighted-average growth rate of per capita 
real disposable personal income was 1.04%, which although significantly below the postwar 
average of 1.8% is within striking distance of the performance necessary to keep the incumbent 
party in the White House. According to the Bread and Peace model other things being equal the 
incumbent party vote share reaches the break-even point of 50% at a weighted-average growth rate 
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of just 1.07%.9 However in 2008 “other things” are not going to be equal. At the beginning of 2008 
the US economy weakened, perhaps drifting into recession.10 And at June 1 2008 cumulative US 
military fatalities in Iraq had reached 4,084. Both developments hurt Republican chances. 
3.1  Growth of Per Capita Real Disposable Personal Income 
 Figure 2 shows the evolution of weighted-average growth of real incomes over the term along 
with various scenarios for real income growth during the last three quarters of 2008. Fairly 
pessimistic scenarios are probable, notwithstanding the fiscal stimulus package passed by congress 
and signed into law by President Bush on February 13 2008 that will raise aggregate disposable 
income by about 1% in the half-year before the election. The relative sizes of the plot points for 
hypothetical 2008 growth rates reflect my reading of the tea leaves.  
As indicated by Figure 2, I think real income growth rates near the postwar average of 1.8% are 
unlikely. 2008q2-2008q4 growth rates will probably be in the vicinity of 0%, which at Election Day 
would yield an over the term weighted-average real growth performance in the vicinity of 0.75%. 
According to the Bread and Peace model such a real income growth record by itself implies a 
relatively narrow victory for the out-party Democratic candidate (presumptively Barack Obama) over 
the incumbent-party Republican candidate (presumptively John McCain) by a margin of 
approximately 2 percentage points: 51% to 49%. 
 
                                                 
9 The estimates in Table 1 imply that 46.2 3.55 ln 50%R+ ⋅Δ =  at ln 1.07RΔ = , where ln RΔ  denotes the over the term 
weighted-average growth rate 
14 14
0 0
.909 ln 1 .909j jt j
j j
R −
= =
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟Δ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ . 
10 US “recessions” are designated semi- officially by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of 
Economic Search (www.nber.org/cycles.html). Recession calls are of course ex-post, usually coming more than a half 
year after recessions begin.  
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3.2  US Military Fatalities in Iraq 
Time paths of US military fatalities in Iraq, quarter-by-quarter and cumulatively, are graphed in 
Figure 3. During the second half of 2007 the fatality rate turned down, falling to about 100 per 
quarter at the end of 2007 from rates of 200 to 300 per quarter in prior years. Contrary to some 
claims, it is doubtful that the decline in American fatalities has much to do with the US “surge” 
launched on January 10 2007, which added approximately 30,000 US troops to the effort to pacify a 
conflict-plagued country of nearly 30 millions. Instead, the Mahdi Army cease fire ordered by the 
Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr on August 29 2007, along with the incorporation of some 80,000 or 
more formerly insurgent Sunni fighters to the US pacification effort (at the bargain price of $10 per 
man per day plus new weaponry) are the main direct reasons for the big improvement in the rate at 
which US soldiers are being killed.11 Both Shia and Sunni (and Kurdish) forces appear to be biding 
                                                 
11 (IISS 2008) describes the various factors at work from a point of view sympathetic to the American effort in Iraq that 
gives the ‘surge’ a lot more (indirect) credit than I do in reducing violence in Iraq. 
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their time and building their strength in preparation for the civil war that many informed observers 
believe will inevitably break out when the US withdraws from Iraq.12  
The time paths of projected fatalities during last three quarters of 2008 depicted in Figure 3 are 
based on the plausible (or perhaps merely the hopeful) assumptions that the Mahdi Army continues 
to stand down and that Sunni fighters remain in cooperative liaison with US forces. Under those 
assumptions cumulative US military fatalities will increase from the June 1 2008 level of 4,084 to 
about 4,300 at the time of the 2008 election. 
 
 
 
4.  2008 Vote Predictions from Political-Economic 
Fundamentals 
Table 2 shows the upshot for the presidential election result of past trends and likely developments 
during 2008 in real income growth and US military fatalities. The first row of the Table reports 
                                                 
12 The US has in effect assembled and armed a powerful sectarian force strengthening the Sunni side in the likely event 
of renewed civil war. See (Powers 2008) for an insightful review of this and related developments. 
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calculations of expected votes at various 2008 real income growth rates under the counterfactual 
situation of zero US military fatalities in Iraq (equivalent to a ‘no invasion’ scenario). The 
counterfactual reveals the Iraq war’s estimated quantitative impact on 2008 votes for president: 
Cumulative fatalities in the vicinity of 4,300 – the projected magnitude around Election Day – 
depress the Republican vote by approximately three-quarters of a percentage point compared to the 
counterfactual benchmark of zero fatalities. An impact that size would be decisive in an election that 
was close on economic grounds alone. But with US fatalities in Iraq running above 4,000, the vote 
projections in Table 2 indicate that 2008q2-2008q4 real income growth rates need to exceed 2% per 
annum for the Republicans to have a decent chance of holding the presidency. As already 
mentioned, growth that high seems unlikely in what shows signs of being a year of at least mild 
recession.  
The shaded region of the Table identifies the most probable combinations of cumulative US 
fatalities in Iraq and weighted-average real income growth. Those political-economic fundamentals 
imply an expected Republican two-party vote share centered on 48.2%. Barring unforeseen political 
shocks favoring the Republican candidate (presumptively John McCain), the Democratic standard 
bearer (presumptively Barack Obama) ought to win the 2008 presidential election by a margin in the 
neighborhood of 3.6 percentage points. 
 
Table 2.  Expected Two-Party Vote Shares for the Republican 
Candidate under Various Assumptions about US Military Fatalities 
in Iraq and Real Income Growth Rates in 2008 
   
Per capita real income growth rates 
2008q2 - 2008q4 (resulting weighted-
average growth over the term) 
   -2 
(0.22) 
-1 
(0.49) 
0 
(0.76) 
+1 
(1.03) 
+2 
(1.30) 
        
Cumulative 
US military 
fatalities at 
2008q4 
(per million 
population) 
0 (0)  47.0% 48.0% 48.9% 49.9% 50.8% 
       
4,100 (13.4)  46.3% 47.3% 48.2% 49.2% 50.1% 
       
4,300 (14.0) 46.3% 47.2% 48.2% 49.2% 50.1% 
       
5,000 (16.3)  46.2%
 
47.1% 48.1% 49.0% 50.0% 
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5.  Qualifications 
The Bread and Peace model aims to quantify the effects of fundamental determinants of 
presidential voting outcomes. However every election is affected by random, idiosyncratic factors 
which at times are important enough to obscure the persistent influence of fundamentals. Indeed 
idiosyncratic events contribute a lot of the fun to political affairs and their unexpected appearance 
and impact from one election to the next are why many of us follow election year developments so 
carefully in the media. Some obvious idiosyncrasies in the 2008 political drama pertain to the race, 
age and health of the contenders. 
In 2008 the Democratic nominee for president presumptively will be an African-American man – 
a first in American major party politics (as would the nomination of Hillary Clinton). Most of us would 
like to think that the US has matured enough that candidate race (or gender) as such are of no 
electoral consequence. Most of us are also realistic enough to know that this untested proposition is 
at best uncertain and, in fact, is probably wrong. Pure race (or gender) effects will cut both ways in 
2008 but on balance they likely will hurt the Democratic Party candidate – more so Obama (the 
presumptive nominee13) than Clinton if one believes, as I do, that nowadays race prejudice 
substantially exceeds gender bias among US voters with a taste for discrimination. 
On the Republican side are the issues of John McCain’s age and health. Should he win election, 
McCain (b. August 29, 1936) would be the oldest first term president ever – a fact that could begin 
to weigh more heavily on voters than earlier as attentions get focused after the party conventions. 
Another episode of melanoma (McCain is known to have had three non-metastatic bouts so far) 
would also be a significant negative. A diagnosis of metastatic melanoma, which would be 
impossible to keep secret, would devastate McCain’s chances producing a much lower Republican 
vote share than expected from fundamental factors. 
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Appendix 
Table A1.  Votes, Predictions and Effects of Fundamental Determinants in Presidential Elections (Fits 
and effects computed from the Bread and Peace equation estimates in Table 1) 
 
In-party v. 
out-party 
candidate 
Election 
year 
% of two-
party vote 
for 
incumbent 
party 
candidate 
Predicted 
% vote 
Prediction 
error 
Weighted-
average 
per capita 
real 
income 
growth, % 
Real 
income 
growth 
effect 
on % 
vote 
Cumulative 
US military 
fatalities 
(per million 
population) 
Fatalities 
effect on 
% vote 
         
Stevenson 
v. 
Eisenhower 
 
1952 44.6 44.8 -0.2 2.4 8.5 29,260 
(190.4) 
-10.0 
Eisenhower 
v. 
Stevenson 
 
1956 57.8 56.5 1.2 2.9 10.3 0 0 
Nixon v. 
Kennedy 
 
1960 49.9 49.3 0.7 0.8 3.0 0 0 
Johnson v. 
Goldwater 
 
1964 61.3 61.2 0.1 4.2 15.1 218 
(0.9) 
-0.0 
Humphrey 
v. Nixon 
 
1968 49.6 49.3 0.3 3.0 10.7 28,896 
(145.6) 
-7.6 
Nixon v. 
McGovern 
 
1972 61.8 59.2 2.6 3.6 13.0 NA 0 
Ford v. 
Carter 
 
1976 49.0 50.1 -1.1 1.1 4.0 414 
(2.1) 
-0.1 
Carter v. 
Reagan 
 
1980 44.7 44.7 -0.0 -0.4 -1.5 0 
 
0 
Reagan v. 
Mondale 
 
1984 59.2 60.1 -0.9 3.9 13.9 0 0 
GHW Bush 
v. Dukakis 
 
1988 53.9 54.3 -0.4 2.3 8.1 0 0 
GHW Bush 
v. Clinton 
 
1992 46.5 47.7 -1.1 0.4 1.4 0 0 
Clinton v. 
Dole 
 
1996 54.7 49.9 4.8 1.0 3.7 0 0 
Gore v. GW 
Bush 
 
2000 50.3 54.6 -4.3 2.4 8.4 0 0 
GW Bush v. 
Kerry 
 
2004 51.2 52.8 -1.5 1.9 6.8 1,130 
(3.9) 
-0.2 
 
